Abstract. Group key exchange protocols (GKE) allow a set of parties to establish a common key over an insecure network. So far the research on GKE mainly focused on identifying and formalizing appropriate security definitions that has led to a variety of different security models. Besides reaching a high security level, another important aspect is to reduce the communication effort. In many practical scenarios it is preferable (or possibly even indispensable) to reduce the number of messages to a minimum, e.g., to save time and/or energy.
Introduction
Many cryptographic mechanisms, especially for confidentiality and authenticity, require a common secret to be shared between the communication partners. Therefore, key exchange protocols (KE) belong to the most practically relevant cryptographic primitives. However, while several secure and efficient KEs are known and used nowadays for the case of n = 2 parties, the situation becomes more complicated in the case of group key exchange protocols (GKE), where a key needs to be established between n > 2 parties.
Obviously, an optimal GKE should achieve the highest security goal with the lowest possible communication effort. Here, the communication effort is usually represented in the number of communication rounds and the number of messages. However, only little is known about the minimum communication effort of GKEs. This question is not only of theoretical interest. In practice the exchange of messages between the parties can be more time consuming than the computations themselves. Thus, reducing the they proved that any 2-round UC-secure 2 GKE with internal-SID generation between n parties requires at least 2n 2 − 2n messages. Observe that this bound relies on two rather strong assumptions: (i) UC-security (which requires straight-line simulatability) and (ii) internal-SID generation. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that both aspects impact the minimum communication effort but the question is to what extent.
Contribution. In this work we pick up the question investigated by Furukawa et al. [15] . First, we derive lower bounds on the communication effort of GKEs based on a selection of minimum security requirements only: forward secrecy (FS) (the corruption of a party has no impact on the security of past protocol runs) and mutual authentication (MA) (an honest participant outputs a key only if all other participants in this group agreed to participate in the GKE and all honest parties generate the same key) in the presence of insider attackers (attackers that actively participate in the protocol). To have a clear separation between the effort for SID generation and key establishment, we consider external-SID GKEs only. We show that under these conditions, GKEs require at least two communication rounds and in this case at least 1 2 n 2 + 1 2 n − 3 messages in total. Interestingly this bound is significantly smaller than the lower bound derived in [15] . This sheds some lights on the "costs" for fulfilling additional requirements (as UCsecurity and SID-generation in this case). To the best of our knowledge the notions of forward secrecy and mutual authentication against insider attackers are covered by any recent security models for GKEs. Thus, they can be seen as basic requirements and the lower bounds should be valid for any current or upcoming security model 3 . We note that the number of messages might be smaller for GKEs that comprise more than two rounds. However, from our point of view, minimizing the number of rounds will have a more significant impact in reducing the time effort for GKEs than reducing the number of messages. The reason is that in practice, we expect that more time is spend for waiting for all messages within one round, i.e., waiting that a round is completed, than for generating the messages themselves. Therefore, minimizing the number of rounds was our primary focus.
Our second contribution is a 2-round GKE that requires 1 2 n 2 + 3 2 n − 2 messages, being n + 1 messages more than the derived lower bound. We prove that the protocol is UC-secure (based on the UC-model given by Katz and Shin [20] ) in the common reference string model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. As UC-security implies FS and MA, the protocol illustrates that GKEs with almost optimal communication effort are possible. Of independent interest might be our observation that although we aim for "symmetric" security properties like mutual authentication, our protocol is highly asymmetric regarding the roles of the different participants. A further interesting observation is that both in the work by Furukawa et al. [15] and in our work, it is shown that one can construct GKEs that are UC-secure and have an almost optimal number of messages. This seems to indicate that considering UC-security has a rather minor impact on the minimum number of messages.
To the best of our knowledge, the most efficient (in number of messages) GKEs so far have been given by Furukawa et al. [15] and Gorantla et al. [17] . Both require 2 rounds and 2n
Preliminaries
In this section we repeat some common aspects of GKE models. We assume for simplicity a fixed group of parties P of potential participants. A GKE is executed between the members of subset pid = {Π 1 , . . . , Π n } ⊆ P where Π i is the party ID of the i-th participant in the GKE. Each protocol execution is labeled by its own session ID (SID) sid that has to be globally unique. If a message (sid, pid, new-session) is send to an honest party Π ∈ pid, a new instance (Π, sid, pid) of Π is invoked. An instance can be seen as a copy of Π that has its own instance state (which, for example, stores all ephemeral values). All instances (Π, sid, pid), Π ∈ pid, start a new execution of a GKE π where each instance uses its own instance state. During this session, every instance (Π, sid, pid) communicates only with other instances (Π , sid , pid ) if (sid, pid) = (sid , pid ), i.e., both instances participate into the same session sid with the same participants pid, and if Π ∈ pid. If an instance (Π, sid, pid) finishes its participation into π, it outputs (Π, sid, pid, κ) with κ being the session key. Afterward, the instance (Π, sid, pid) and its corresponding instance state is deleted.
As pointed out in Sec. 1, the definition of an appropriate security model for GKEs is still in the focus of current research. However, several requirements exist that are commonly agreed to be part of any meaningful security model. In the following, we single out some of these and explain them shortly. We refer to Appendix A for a formal treatment of the considered security notions. We emphasize that the following list of conditions does not represent a full security model than rather a set of necessary basic requirements. In Sec. 3 we will show that these already imply some lower bounds on the communication effort. In consequence, the derived bounds automatically hold as well for any more elaborate security model that comprises the mentioned aspects.
An adversary can invoke a GKE between any subset pid ⊆ P. In addition, she can control the communication within the network, and corrupt any party. Corruption means that she literally takes over control of the corrupted party and learns all its secrets. If corrupted parties participate into the protocol one speaks of insider attackers. Obviously, the secrecy of the key cannot be longer achieved in such cases but other security properties can still be true. One security requirement that is usually put on a GKE in the context of corruption is forward secrecy: if an attacker corrupts a party Π at some point in time, this does not impact the security of past protocol runs which Π participated to. Another established security requirement is mutual authentication: an honest party only outputs a key if all parties in the same group confirmed their participation and keys generated by honest parties are equal.
Lower Bounds on the Communication Effort
In this section, we derive lower bounds on the number of rounds and the number of exchanged messages in GKEs that provide forward secrecy and mutual authentication in the presence of insider attackers. We prove our lower bounds by contradiction. We show that if the communication effort is below the specified bounds, then there exists either an insider adversary who violates mutual authentication or an outsider adversary who breaks forward secrecy. Proof. The case of n = 2 parties is straightforward. There is only one possible pair of parties so that the claims are obviously true. Hence, we restrict to the case n ≥ 3 in the following.
We describe for each claim a possible protocol execution (termed execution 1 and 2 and displayed in Fig. 1 (2) i . These use two independent random tapes, denoted by ρ (1) i and ρ (2) i , respectively. Let pid (1) denote the set of all instances Π (1) i for i ≥ 3, and define analogously pid (2) .
The core idea of the proof is to show that the adversary A who controls the communication within the network can execute the protocol such that Π 1 receives messages only from pid
(1) ∪ {Π 2 } while Π 2 receives messages only from pid (2) ∪ {Π 1 }. We explain now in more detail how each message is handled. Each message from either Π 1 or Π 2 to any other party Π i ∈ pid is forwarded to both instances Π (1) i and Π (2) i . However, the other way around, only messages from pid (1) to Π 1 and from pid (2) to Π 2 are forwarded while both messages from pid (1) to Π 2 and messages from pid (2) to Π 1 are dropped. All messages between Π 1 and Π 2 are forwarded. All messages from pid (1) to pid are only sent to the corresponding instance in pid (1) and analogously for messages from pid (2) to pid. Any other messages are deleted. Execution 1 is displayed in Figure 1 
to use the same session ID sid as Π 1 and Π 2 . Furthermore note that Π 1 and Π 2 communicate with different party instances pid (1) and pid (2) which use different random tapes ρ (1) i and ρ (2) i respectively. As Π 1 and Π 2 exchange only messages in the first round, the communication between Π 1 and Π 2 does not depend on any message from pid. Hence, they are not able to notice that each of them communicated with different instances from pid. Now, by assumption the protocol provides mutual authentication which implies that all (honest) parties generate the same session key. Hence, the key has to be independent of the random tapes of pid which shows the first claim.
Regarding the second claim, assume two different pairs of parties (Π 1 , Π 2 ) and (Π 1 , Π 2 ) who have no direct communication in the second round. Then it follows from claim 1 that either {Π 1 , Π 2 } ∩ {Π 1 , Π 2 } = ∅ or that the exchanged key is independent of the random tapes of all parties. The latter case contradicts the assumption that the protocol provides forward secrecy.
Hence, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
This means in particular (with the same arguments as above) that the key depends only on the random tape of Π 1 . Consider now execution 2 in which all messages are honestly forwarded by the adversary except of the following ones, which are discarded:
This execution is illustrated in Figure 1(b) . In this execution, Π 2 cannot notice that some of messages are dropped since it receives only messages that are independent of the dropped messages. More precisely, Π 2 cannot notice that the messages {m 1 Πi→Π1 } i≥2 are deleted as it has no communication with Π 1 in the second round by assumption. Furthermore, as none of the messages specified in 2. and 3. are addressed for Π 2 and as the protocol has in total two rounds, Π 2 cannot observe that these messages have been dropped. Concluding, from Π 2 's point of view, the execution was correct and it outputs the correct session key at the end of the execution by assumption.
We also observe that Π 1 receives no messages from other parties and that all messages Π 1 sends in the second round are dropped. That means, an adversary can copy all the messages Π 1 sends in the first round of one session and later, even after the session is over (after the key is deleted), the adversary can corrupt pid \ Π 1 and recover the key exchanged in the session as Π 2 is able to compute the correct session key (as argued above). This contradicts forward secrecy, showing the claim.
Theorem 2.
In the first round of a 2-round GKE π with n parties that achieves forward secrecy and mutual authentication in respect to insider attackers, at least n−2 messages are sent.
Proof. In the case of n = 2 parties, this is obviously true as less than n − 2 = 0 messages are impossible. We consider the case of n ≥ 3 parties in the following. We first borrow some vocabulary from graph theory (see [6] for a reference). A path is a sequence of vertices such that there is an edge between two consecutive vertices. Two vertices u and v in a graph are connected if the graph contains a path from u to v. Otherwise, they are disconnected. A connected component of a graph is a maximal subgraph in which any two vertices are connected to each other. Obviously each vertex belongs to exactly one connected component.
We consider parties of a GKE as vertices of a graph G and define an (undirected) edge between two parties Π i and Π j if Π i sends a message directly to Π j in the first round or vice versa. Then, there exists a unique (up to re-ordering) partition of the set of parties pid into disjunct subsets pid 1 , . . . , pid such that each group pid i a connected component of G.
In case of = 3, we construct an imaginary GKEπ out of π as follows. We consider each group pid 1 , pid 2 , and pid 3 as a party inπ. For each i, the random tape of pid i is the concatenation of the random tapes of all parties Π ∈ pid i . If Π ∈ pid i sends a message to Π ∈ pid i , we consider it is an internal process of pid i . When Π ∈ pid i sends a message to Π ∈ pid j = pid i , we define that pid i sends the message to pid j . When some parties in pid i output keys, we choose the first key that was given out and define it as being the key generated by pid i . When Π ∈ pid i is corrupted, the whole set pid i is corrupted as a party.
Since the parties pid 1 , pid 2 , and pid 3 are by definition different connected components, they are in particular pairwise disconnected. That is, no messages are exchanged in the first round ofπ. Hence, we can ignore the first round of the original GKE and considerπ as a 2-round GKE in which participants send no messages in the second round. In particular, pid 1 and pid 2 do not exchange any messages in the second round ofπ. This implies that, as discussed in the proof of Theorem 1, the session key does not depend on the random tape of pid 3 . By the same argument, the session key does not depend on the random tapes of pid 1 and pid 2 either. Therefore, there exists an attacker A that violates the forward secrecy or mutual authentication ofπ. Obviously,Ā can be easily translated into an attacker A that successfully attacks π which contradicts the assumption.
Therefore, there are at most two connected components, w.l.o.g. pid 1 and pid 2 . By the definition of connected components, at least |pid 1 | − 1 messages are sent within pid 1 and likewise |pid 2 | − 1 messages are sent within pid 2 . This shows that at least Proof. For the first claim, assume that π uses only one round. 1-round protocols can be considered as 2-round protocols, where no messages are sent in the first or second round. In the first case, Theorem 2 implies that the number n of parties is at most 2. In the second case, Theorem 1 implies that the number n of parties is at most 2 since there exists at most one pair of parties who does not exchange any messages in the second round. As we consider the case of n ≥ 3 parties, this yields a contradiction. Hence, n ≥ 3 implies that at least 2 rounds are required, showing the first claim. Now consider a 2-round protocol. By Theorem 2, at least n − 2 messages are necessary in the first round. By Theorem 1, there exists at most one pair who does not exchange any message in the second round. As a consequence, the second round requires at least n·(n−1) 2 − 1 messages. Adding both together yields the second claim.
The Proposed Protocol
In the following, we propose a 2-round group key exchange protocol which is an extension of the Burmester-Desmedt star-based protocol [12] . It requires 1 2 n 2 + 3 2 n − 2 messages which is exactly n + 1 more than the lower bound derived in the previous section. In that sense, our protocol is close to the lower bound and is asymptotically optimal. In Sec. 5 we prove that the protocol is UC-secure according to the model given by Katz and Shin [20] .
Before we describe the protocol into details, we give an overview on the basic ideas and its structure. We index each party in pid by i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, that is Π i denotes the i-th party, and assume that the indices are uniquely determined from pid. Furthermore, we presume that one single party is fixed, w.l.o.g. Π 1 . All parties can agree to the same single party without the need of additional communication, for example by choosing the party whose identifier is the first in lexicographical order in pid. Each party Π i has its own pair of public/private keys (PK i , SK i ) for signing messages and the public keys are known to all parties. Once a party Π j receives a message (sid, pid, new-session), a party instance (Π j , sid, pid) is created. For simplicity we identify the party instances (Π j , sid, pid) with the parties Π j .
The protocol is conceptually divided into 4 protocols π 1 , . . . , π 4 , that run in parallel. These are briefly explained in Table 1 . In protocols π 1 and π 2 , all necessary information are distributed that allow for computing the group key κ. With protocol π 3 every party confirms to the others that it accepted to participate into a protocol identified by (sid, pid). This mechanism prevents an adversary from impersonating honest parties. Via protocol π 4 , every party signs the commitment com and sends the signature to some other parties according to a distribution schedule. Here, in principle any schedule can be used as long as it guarantees that within each pair of parties, at least one of both receives a signature σ from the other. One possible realization is that Π i sends the signatures to all Π j with i < j. This allows the recipient to check if both share the same key. Observe that we do not require that every party gets a signature from every other party. We will show that this is still sufficient for guaranteeing mutual authentication. From our point of view, it is an interesting observation that an asymmetric condition is sufficient for ensuring a symmetric security property. Π1 generates a group key κ and sends a commitment com on κ to every other party. π3
Every party Πj for j = i generates a signature σ j on (sid, pid) and sends it to Π1.
Round 2 π2 Π1
sends an encrypted opening of com to each Π j =1 (using the bilateral keys x j from π1). π3 Π1 distributes the set {σ } of signatures to all parties. π4 Every Πj generates a signature σj on (sid, pid, com) and sends it to some other parties according to a predefined distribution schedule.
Key generation (a party accepts the key κ if . . . ) π2
com is a commitment on κ. π3
Every σ is a valid signature of Π on (sid, pid). π4 Πj received all signatures σ from Π according to the distribution schedule.
We now present a concrete description. We use a 1-round 2-party key exchange protocol here, being essentially the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol with authenticated channels where a universal hash function is applied to the result to generate a smooth key. To improve the efficiency of the protocol, Π 1 uses the same ephemeral state r 1 for all key exchange protocols.
Let (TGen, TCom, TVer, TOpen) be a trapdoor commitment scheme. Given a security parameter k , the probabilistic algorithm TGen outputs a pair of parameters and trapdoor (prm, τ). Given parameters prm and a message μ, the probabilistic algorithm TCom outputs a pair of commitment and decommitment (com, dec) on the message μ. Given prm, μ, com, and dec, TVer accepts (and outputs (acc)) if com is a correct commitment on μ. Otherwise it rejects and outputs (rej). Given prm, μ, dec, τ, and another message μ , TOpen outputs another decommitment dec such that TVer accepts (prm, μ , com, dec ). Although the following description of our protocol uses a trapdoor commitment scheme, our protocol also works with commitment schemes that do not provide a trapdoor. Actually, the trapdoor is only used to allow straight-line simulatability for the proof of UC-security (Sec. 5).
Let k, k , m, m , λ be security parameters, where k is the length of the group key and m is the minimum integer such that D, defined as the space of decommitments dec, is a subset of {0, 1} m . Let p be a prime of size k + λ + 1 and G be a cyclic group of prime orders p with a generator g.
k+m be a universal hash function [18] , φ : G → {0, 1} k be a projection, and define UH(z, v) := UH (φ(z), v). We assume k and m to be sufficiently large so that (v, UH(z, v) ) for randomly chosen z ∈ G and v ∈ {0, 1} m is indistinguishable from (v, x ) when x is randomly distributed in {0, 1}
k+m . The necessary size of k and m are determined by the leftover hash lemma [18, 19] . The system parameters are k, k , m, m , λ, p, G, g, prm, and UH.
We also require G, φ to be chosen such that φ −1 : {0, 1} k → G can be efficiently computed with overwhelming probability and that the size of φ −1 (y) for randomly chosen y ∈ {0, 1} k is sufficiently large. This is possible if G is an elliptic curve of a prime order p and φ extracts the least significant k bits of the x-coordinate of given point in G with a large λ. Then, given a point in {0, 1} k , there are 2 λ possible xcoordinates on average. For each candidate, there exists a y-coordinate with probability 1/2 such that this pair is a point on the curve. Thus, if one tries 2 λ possible values in G, an appropriate z ∈ G can be found with probability at least 1−1/2 2 λ . Hence, choosing a sufficiently large λ, an appropriate G and φ can be found. This later allows the adversary to find z ∈ G such that (κ, dec) = UH(z, v) for randomly given κ ∈ {0, 1} k , dec ∈ D, and v ∈ {0, 1} m . At the beginning of the protocol, a value prm is randomly chosen according to the distribution induced by TGen 5 and is given to all parties as a common reference string for the protocol. For the sake of readability, we implicitly assume that all participating parties received (presumably correct) messages according to the protocol and stores all necessary values that are required for a successful protocol run. For example, a party participates only into the protocol if it initially received a (sid, pid, new-session). If this does not happen in a certain time period, the party does not further take part into the protocol without some further actions (e.g., requesting the missing messages, aborting, etc.). The full description of the protocol is given in Fig. 2 .
Communication effort. In the first round Π 1 sends n − 1 messages and each of the other n − 1 parties send exactly one message, thus 2(n − 1) messages in total. In the second round, for each pair of parties, exactly one party sends one message to the other, giving n(n − 1)/2 messages in the second round. Altogether, 2(n − 1) + n(n − 1)/2 = 
Proof of Security
In this section we prove that the proposed protocol achieves UC-security according to the model given by Katz and Shin [20] . We suggest this work and [13] for a more detailed description of UC. Informally, a protocol π realizes a cryptographic task in an Round 1 Π1, Computation: Π1 randomly chooses a group key κ ∈ {0, 1} k and generates a commitment on these values: (com, dec) := TCom(κ). Furthermore, it randomly picks r1 ∈ Z/pZ and computes y1 = g r 1 . Finally, it samples random values vj ∈ {0, 1} m , j = 2, . . . , n, and generates signatures σ 1,j on (sid, pid, com, y1, vj ) for j = 2, . . . , n. Π1, Storage: Π1 stores (sid, pid, dec, κ, (vj )j=2,...,n, r1) . Π1, Communication: Π1 sends to each Πj ∈ pid \ {Π1} the message (Π1; sid, pid, com, y1, vj , σ 1,j ) Π i = Π1, Computation: Πi randomly chooses ri ∈ Z/pZ and computes yi = g r i . Then Πi generates a signature σ i on (sid, pid, yi). ) and a signature σi on (sid, pid, com). Π i = Π1, Storage: Πi updates its storage to (sid, pid, com, x i ). Π i = Π1, Communication: Πi sends (Πi; sid, pid, com, σi) to all Πj ∈ pid specified by the distribution schedule.
Key generation

Π1, Computation:
If every σj is a valid signature on (sid, pid, com) by Πj, then Π1 outputs (sid, pid, κ) and deletes its storage (instance state). Π i = Π1, Computation: If all received signatures are correct, then it computes (κi, deci) = x i ⊕ xi. If acc = TVer(prm, κi, com, deci), then Πi outputs (sid, pid, κ) and deletes its state.
Fig. 2. The protocol
UC-secure way if no pair of environment Z and real adversary A, can distinguish the protocol execution in the real world, called real execution, from the execution of an ideal functionality F in an ideal world, called ideal execution. F can be seen as a kind of black box that ideally realizes the considered cryptographic task. We recall in Fig. 3 the definition of its ideal functionality for GKEs from Katz and Shin [20] .
Ideal Functionality FGKE
( [20] ) The ideal functionality F GKE interacts with parties Φ1, . . . , Φn and an ideal adversary S. F GKE runs on a security parameter k. Initialization: Upon receiving (sid, pid, new-session) from a party Φi for the first time (where |pid| ≥ 2), F GKE records (sid, pid, Φi) and sends this to S. Once the tuples (sid, pid, Φj ) for all Φj ∈ pid are recorded, F GKE stores (sid, pid, ready) and sends it to S. Key generation: Upon receiving a message (sid, pid, ok) from S where there is a recorded tuple (sid, pid, ready), it checks if all Φj ∈ pid are uncorrupted. If this is the case, it chooses uniformly a key κ ∈ {0, 1} k and stores (sid, pid, κ). If any of the parties Φj ∈ pid is corrupted, it waits for S to send a message (sid, pid, key, κ) and then stores (sid, pid, κ). Key delivery: If S sends a message (sid, pid, deliver, Φi) where there is a recorded tuple (sid, pid, κ) and Φi ∈ pid, then F GKE sends (sid, pid, κ) to party Φi. Player corruption: If S corrupts Φi ∈ pid where there is a recorded tuple (sid, pid, κ) but a message (sid, pid, κ) has not yet been sent to Φi, then S is given κ, otherwise nothing. 
Theorem 3. The protocol described in Sec. 4 UC-realizes the ideal functionality of GKE if the used signature scheme is secure and if the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the common reference string model.
For the proof, we have to give an ideal adversary S such that no pair of environment Z and real adversary A can tell apart a real execution (i.e., real parties Π i executing the protocol) and an ideal execution (i.e., S simulates parties Π S i compatibly to the outputs of the ideal functionality F := F GKE that in turn communicates with ideal parties Φ i ).
We first define an ideal adversary S and show afterward in Lemmas 1 and 2 that it fulfills the condition from above. S has black box access to the real adversary A. Messages from Z to S (Z believes it is sending to A) are forwarded to A and vice versa. Additionally, S simulates the real parties Π i on behalf of all uncorrupted ideal parties Φ i . The simulated parties are denoted by Π S i . As opposed to the ideal parties, the simulated parties participate in a protocol execution. At the beginning, S generates for every Π S j a public/private key pairs (PK j , SK j ) for digital signatures and gives the public keys to A. Any messages sent by A to Π i are processed by Π S i , and any messages output by Π S i are given to A. S also runs TGen(k ) for a security parameter k to obtain (prm, τ). prm is the common reference string of the protocol.
In addition to the above, the ideal adversary S proceeds as follows: to obtain a key κ from F . This might either been provided by S before or been generated by F . In the first case, S simply forwards the internal state of Π S i to A. In the second case, we make use of the fact that S has already sent (sid, pid, ok). This implies either of the following: ¬Φ 1 : When i = 1, at least Φ 1 in pid has already sent x i to Φ i . S uses the trapdoor τ to generate a fitting decommitment dec, that is dec = TOpen(prm, κ , dec , τ, κ). Here, (κ , dec ) are the values generated by Π S 1 , i.e., (com, dec ) = TCom(prm, κ ). Then, S generates x i = x i ⊕ (κ, dec) and hands to A the instance state (sid, pid, com, x i ). We note it is possible to find z i such that x i = UH(z i , v i ) with overwhelming probability if λ is long enough. Φ 1 : When i = 1, S hands to A the instance state (sid, pid, com, κ). COR.ok.del: If S has already sent (sid, pid, deliver, Φ i ) to F , then S returns nothing (i.e., an empty instance state) to A.
Next we show that the ideal adversary S aborts only with negligible probability (Lemma 1) and that the real and the ideal execution are indistinguishable (under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption) if S does not abort (Lemma 2). From these two Lemmas, Theorem 3 follows immediately. Suppose now that the abort took place in the case of COR.ok.¬del. This means that on the one hand S has send before the message (sid, pid, ok) and hence there exists an uncorrupted simulated party Π S j ∈ pid who has output (sid, pid, κ). On the other hand, the abort condition tells that there exists a simulated party Π S i that has not finished the first round at this point in time. In particular, Π S i had not send a signed message so far. With the same arguments as above, this can only happen if A forged a signature.
It remains to consider the final case: SKG.cor.ok. By definition S has to deal only with key generation if the key is generated by an uncorrupted party. The abort condition says in principle that two uncorrupted parties Π i and Π j have generated two different keys κ and κ , respectively. Recall that the key is reconstructed from a commitment distributed by Π 1 . As the commitment has been signed by Π 1 and as at least one of the two parties can check if both received the same commitment, it must hold that Π i and Π j received the same commitment com (as none of them aborted) unless A has forged a signature. But then the binding property of the commitment schemes implies that κ = κ what contradicts the assumption 6 . Hence, this case can also only happen in the case of a signature forgery. Proof. Suppose that there exists an environment Z that can distinguish between the ideal execution and the real execution. We will first show that Z does not gain any useful information by corrupting parties. As a consequence we can restrict w.l.o.g. to an environment Z that does no corruption at all. Finally, we will construct an algorithm B from Z that allows for solving the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.
Assume that Z corrupts a party before any key has been generated. By definition of S, from this point on Z only communicates with the simulated parties (e.g., learns its states after corruption) and receives the results of the simulated protocol run. In other words, the ideal functionality F is no longer involved. Obviously, in this case the real and ideal executions are indistinguishable as the simulated parties behave exactly like real parties. Now we turn our attention to the case that Z only corrupts after a key has been generated. By definition, this means that the key κ of the simulated protocol run has been replaced by a key κ that has been given by the ideal functionality. In particular all players have finished both rounds already (the information send around at the end of round 2 are a necessary pre-requisite for key generation). In the case that Π 1 gets corrupted, Z receives the values (sid, pid, com, κ) (where κ is the key generated by F ). This is obviously a perfect simulation. In the case that Π j = Π 1 gets corrupted, the situation becomes a little bit more tricky: besides the values mentioned above, a real party would additionally store an encryption of a decommitment dec that opens the distributed commitment com to the "real" key κ . Here we make use of the trapdoor in the commitment scheme and replace dec by another decommitment dec that opens com to κ (instead of κ ). By the definition of the commitment scheme, this yields a perfect simulation as well.
Concluding, an environment Z does not observe any differences between both executions via corruption. Thus, we can restrict to an environment Z that does not corrupt at all. We construct from Z an algorithm B that breaks the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. That is given a triple (g, a, b, c) = (g, g α , g β , g γ ), we construct an algorithm B (based on Z ) that decides whether α · β = γ or not.
B behaves in principle like the ideal adversary S except of the following difference. B replaces the values occurring within the Diffie-Hellman key exchange by other parameters that are derived from the problem instance mentioned above as follows:
where {μ j , ν j ∈ Z/pZ} j=1,...,n are randomly chosen. The fact that B does not know the discrete logarithms of these values (as opposed to the real execution) is not a problem as Z does not corrupt by assumption. Observe that z j is a Diffie-Hellman key derived from y 1 and y j if and only if α · β = γ. Therefore, if α · β = γ, then B acts exactly like S. By assumption Z can distinguish between the ideal or real execution in this case. However, if α · β = γ then the messages of the parties are independent of the key κ. Thus, Z cannot have any advantage in this case. Now, B invokes Z several times with different values of μ j and ν j and estimates the advantage of Z . If this is negligible, then B assumes that α · β = γ. Otherwise it guesses that α · β = γ. With the arguments above, this yields a distinguisher for the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Concluding we have seen that (under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption) that for none of the three cases an environment can exist that efficiently distinguishes between both executions.
Conclusion
We addressed the question of the communication complexity in group key exchange (GKE) protocols. We derived from basic security requirements, i.e., forward secrecy and mutual authentication, that any GKE needs at least two rounds and a lower bound on the number of messages for this case. Furthermore we presented a UC-secure protocol that almost achieves these bounds.
Still, several open questions remain. Some of them are: (1) Is it possible to either construct protocols that exactly meet these bounds or can it be proved that the minimum effort is actually higher? (2) Can we determine the effort for additional requirements, e.g., contributiveness, etc.? (3) Are UC-secure protocols possible with the same communication effort as our protocol but within the standard model? (4) Are less messages possible if one considers GKEs with more than 2 rounds?
